Baseline: $28T (2024) → $75T (2075) at 2% real growth
Fiscal effect: Entitlement reform reduces debt burden (+growth); deficits crowd out investment (−growth). ~0.03% annual boost per $100B savings.
Tax drag: Each 0.01 TFR drag ≈ 0.1% lower annual growth, compounded over 50 years.
Inflation drag: Persistent inflation from fiscal dominance reduces growth through investment uncertainty, menu costs, and capital misallocation. ~0.05-0.2% lower annual growth per 1pp inflation.
Population: Higher TFR → larger workforce. Each +1.0 TFR ≈ +0.5% annual growth (phases in year 20-30).
Immigration: Adds population + productivity. Effect on GDP/capita depends on immigrant productivity vs native (employment rate × skill premium).
Sources: CBO long-term projections; Maestas et al. (2016); Elmendorf & Sheiner (2017); Fischer (1993), Barro (1995), Bruno & Easterly (1998) on inflation-growth.
Base Score: 60 (moderately feasible)
Grading: A (≥80), B (60-79), C (40-59), D (20-39), F (<20)
Note: Illiberal policies (abortion/contraception bans, etc.) automatically require authoritarianism → F grade.
Stage 1: Deficit → Inflation
| Normal | Policy deficit × 0.30 |
| Elevated (6-8%) | Blended deficit × 0.30 |
| Stressed (8-10%) | Total deficit × 0.30–0.45 |
| Dominance (>10%) | Total deficit × 0.45–0.75 |
Sources: Catão & Terrones (2005) find 0.2-0.4pp inflation per 1% GDP deficit; Lin & Chu (2013) meta-analysis confirms range; SF Fed (Jordà 2022), Bernanke-Blanchard NBER (2023) on post-COVID fiscal-inflation link.
Stage 2: CB Absorption
| <6% GDP | 75% |
| 6-8% | 50-75% |
| 8-10% | 35-50% |
| >10% | 25-35% |
Sources: Sargent & Wallace (1981) "Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic"; BIS Papers No. 65; Cochrane (2023) "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level"; Boston Fed (2025) on household dominance expectations.
Stage 3: Expectations
Unanchor thresholds by regime: Normal 4%, Stressed 3.5%, Dominance 3%
Sources: Leeper (1991) active/passive policy regimes; Bianchi & Melosi (2017) on regime-switching; 1970s US unanchoring at ~6% CPI.
Stage 4: CPI → TFR
| 0-2pp | −1.5% TFR/pp |
| 2-5pp | −3.0% TFR/pp |
| 5-10pp | −5.0% TFR/pp |
| 10-20pp | −7.0% TFR/pp |
| >20pp | −10.0% TFR/pp |
| Uncertainty amp | ×1.0–1.5 (gradual) |
Sources: Adsera (2004, 2011) uncertainty-fertility; Sobotka et al. (2011) recession effects; Comolli (2017) Great Recession.
Uncertainty amplifier: Ramps from ×1.0 at crisis threshold to ×1.5 at +3pp above. Eliminates step-function cliff.
Historical Calibration:
Turkey 2018-24: CPI peaked ~85%, TFR fell 2.10→1.51 (−28%). Implies ~0.35% TFR per 1pp—but spread over years. Acute shock elasticity higher.
Russia 1992-99: Hyperinflation + transition crisis, TFR collapsed 1.89→1.16 (−39%). Economic chaos amplified beyond pure inflation.
E. Europe 1989-95: Transition economies saw 30-40% TFR declines under combined inflation + uncertainty shock.
Crisis regime: Uses ABSOLUTE CPI (minus 2% floor). TFR floor: 0.80
Current calculation:
Mechanism: Distortionary taxes reduce growth through labor supply effects, reduced investment, and capital misallocation. Lower growth = lower wages and higher uncertainty.
Elasticity:
| 1% GDP reduction | ~0.005 TFR reduction |
| 0.01 TFR drag | ≈ 0.1% annual GDP drag |
Sources: Becker (1960) income-fertility; Keane (2011) labor supply meta-analysis; CBO tax/GDP estimates; Romer & Romer (2010) tax multipliers.
Note: Entitlement reform has no growth drag—it's a transfer, not a distortion.
Tap any policy name to see methodology and sources.
Intergenerational rebalancing. These offsets have no growth penalty—the only "free" funding source.
Alternative funding. Tap any policy name to see sources for growth drag estimates. Adjust thresholds to see revenue/drag tradeoffs.
Immigration affects TFR (immigrant fertility + native crowdout), GDP (population + productivity), and fiscal balance (net lifetime contributions). Based on Danish Finance Ministry lifecycle data and demographic convergence research.
How immigrants are selected affects skill composition, fiscal impact, and fertility.
Adjust parameters for the selected mechanism.
Generational Effects: 2nd-gen shows partial convergence (40% toward native), NOT full reversion to mean. Danish data: MENAPT gen2 employment ~65% (vs gen1 52%, native 79%). Gen2 fiscal ~50% better than gen1 but still below native for low-skill origins. Parrado & Morgan (2008), Hansen et al. (2017).
Native Fertility Crowdout: Calibrated to Seah (2018) Mariel Boatlift: 7% labor shock → 8-11% rent increase → 14% fertility decline among renters. Refugee/diversity streams cause ~60% more crowdout per capita (lower income, higher density). Saiz (2007), Dettling & Kearney (2014).
Fiscal NPV: Danish Finance Ministry (2018) lifecycle by origin. MENAPT gen1: −$165k NPV, gen2: −$79k NPV. Selection mechanism matters: employment-based ~3× better fiscal than family/refugee.
GDP Channel: Per-capita productivity = employment rate × skill premium. These parameters carry substantial uncertainty—actual integration outcomes vary by host-country policy, labor market conditions, and origin-specific factors. Model uses Danish/Canadian benchmarks but does not capture all integration frictions.
Integration Penalty: Above 1.5M/year, productivity is penalized 10% per 500k (max 30% at 3M). Reflects labor market absorption limits, infrastructure strain, and social service capacity constraints at high inflow levels.
Housing Costs: Immigration increases housing demand. Rather than modeling housing separately, this effect is captured through the native fertility crowdout channel (rent-driven fertility decline). Local housing constraints and zoning effects are not modeled separately.